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INTRODUCTION: SETTING THE STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
It is a commonplace observation that most of the unresolved tension in
American constitutional law has less to do with the nuances of particular
substantive provisions and more to do with the standard of review that courts-
the Supreme Court, most specifically-bring to any challenged government
action, be it a statute, a regulation or an executive action. As commonly
understood, the American constitutional world, like Gaul, is divided into three
parts, in descending order of constitutional severity. Strict scrutiny, intermediate
scrutiny, and rational basis form the basic triad. The higher the standard of
scrutiny, the lower the probability that the government action will survive a
judicial challenge. It should not be thought, however, that the three tests stand
equidistant from one another, like one, five and nine on a number scale. In
practice, intermediate scrutiny is a lot closer to strict scrutiny than it is to
rational basis, like one, three and nine.
* Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; the Peter and Kirsten
Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution; and the James Parker Hall Distinguished Service
Professor Emeritus and Senior Lecturer, the University of Chicago. This paper is prepared for a
conference, "Is the Rational Basis Test Unconstitutional?" cosponsored by the Georgetown Center for
the Constitution and the Institute for Justice's Center for Judicial Engagement, held at the Georgetown
University Law Center on February 11-12, 2016. The paper was discussed the day before Justice Scalia
died, and it may well be the case that he would not have agreed with a single word of it. But I
nonetheless belatedly dedicate it to the memory of a most extraordinary justice and human being. I
should also like to thank Rachel Cohn, Philip Cooper, Julia Haines, Madeline Lansky and John Tienken
of the University of Chicago Law School for their excellent research assistance. © 2016, Richard A.
Epstein.
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I shall not long tarry to give definitions of these three standards that capture
every doctrinal nuance. That is difficult now that the standards have been so
battered over time that they no longer remain in their pristine state. Thus it is no
longer clear what strict scrutiny means in connection with affirmative action
programs' or what rational basis means in connection with gay rights; 2 and
those meanings differ from its use in such central areas as federal jurisdiction,
economic liberties and property rights. Whatever the development on hot-button
social issues, in these core areas it is the case that whenever the rational basis
test is closely associated with the use of the word "conceivable" 3 or "irratio-
nal,"4 the constitutional challenge is over before it begins. This conclusion is
inescapable in light of one of the canonical expressions of the rational basis test:
FCC v. Beach Communications. The key question was whether to uphold a
regulation that distinguished "between facilities that serve separately owned and
managed buildings and those that serve one or more buildings under common
ownership or management." 6 The D.C. Circuit-in a short per curiam opinion,
joined only by Judges Edwards and Douglas Ginsburg-found this rationale to
be "a naked intuition, unsupported by conceivable facts or policies." Dissent-
ing from this pair of ideological opposites was Chief Judge Mikva, who
dissented on the strength of a previous concurrence in the case" without further
elaboration. The adverse decision below did not deter Justice Thomas when he
wrote for an eight-member majority of the Supreme Court, with only Justice
Stevens concurring in the result:
On rational-basis review, a classification in a statute such as the Cable Act
comes to us bearing a strong presumption of validity .... Moreover, because
1. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
2. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2071 (2015).
3. Perhaps the most famous example can be found in Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241
(1984): "Where the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public
purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause." On
this basis, the Court held that the legislature could require a landlord to sell his reversion to his tenant
through the intervention of state power, which was only exercised after the tenant put the purchase price
into escrow so that the government never faced any financial risk.
4. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2616-17 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (parenthetical omitted) ("'This [C]ourt
will certainly not substitute its judgment for that of Congress unless the relation of the subject to
interstate commerce and its effect upon it are clearly non-existent.' When appraising such legislation,
we ask only (1) whether Congress had a 'rational basis' for concluding that the regulated activity
substantially affects interstate commerce, and (2) whether there is a reasonable connection between the
regulatory means selected and the asserted ends. In answering these questions, we presume the statute
under review is constitutional and may strike it down only on a 'plain showing' that Congress acted
irrationally." (citing Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 326 (1981))).
5. 508 U.S. 307 (1999).
6. Id. at 309.
7. Beach Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 965 F.2d 1103, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
8. Beach Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 959 F.2d 975, 988-91 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Mikva, C.J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
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we never require a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it
is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason
for the challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature. 9
Most modern legislative schemes are complex with many moving parts. The
rationales that can be given to support them are as numerous as they are flimsy.
A decision rule that allows one good rationale to dictate the outcome provides
an "open sesame" that virtually guarantees that any statute subject to the
rational basis test is constitutional at birth, no matter how dubious its political or
intellectual pedigree.
The simple fact that some government legislators or officials are prepared to
back a particular course of action becomes proof positive that someone benefits
from the statute, which is all that is needed to make this claim. It is therefore
difficult to find any type of government action that is exposed to special
vulnerability under the rational basis test. Both structural and individual rights
challenges are cut down by the same scythe.
The question is why this should be the case on grounds of either constitu-
tional text or constitutional structure. On the former, there is no explicit
differentiation among the various guarantees that are set out in the Constitution,
which otherwise might lead anyone to say that (some forms of) speech and
some forms of government action should receive higher levels of scrutiny. All
the commands found in the Constitution are written in the strong indicative: we
know what the government can and cannot do, with no leeway for error. In each
substantive area, to be sure, there are separate interpretive questions that cry out
for particular solutions; but as a textual matter, the basic guides of interpretation
are no different from those of other texts of either a contractual or statutory
origin.
As I have argued at length elsewhere, there are at least four challenges that
are presented by cryptic texts such as those found in documents from the Ten
Commandments to the Constitution. o The first of these is the textual challenge
itself. We have to have a definition of the term "commerce," and by ordinary
English that term is defined in opposition to such activities as manufacture,
mining and agriculture-all of which the post-New Deal jurisprudence neverthe-
less says is included in its definition. It is as if the Uniform Commercial Code
covered agriculture, manufacturing and mining." Similarly, we have to give a
definition to private property, which in modern constitutional discussion is often
9. FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).
10. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION, ch. 3 (2014); Richard A. Epstein, A
Common Lawyer Looks at Constitutional Interpretation, 72 B.U. L. REv. 699 (1992).
11. See e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118 (1942) (upholding the intrastate regulation of
how much wheat a farmer could grow on his own farm even though the wheat was "not intended in any
part for commerce but wholly for consumption on the farm.").
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limited to the right to exclude, 12 without including the rights of use and
disposition that have long formed part of the common understandings of the use
of that term in private law. 13 It is no mere coincidence that the first of these
major changes is used to expand the scope of federal power, and the second is
used to reduce the level of individual protection against that expanded govern-
ment use, as embodied, for example, in the untenable constitutional distinction
between a permanent physical taking (ostensibly subject to a per se rule)1 4 and a
regulatory taking that is subject to the lower rational basis standard.1 5
But why engage in these pyrotechnics in the first place? The central challenge
of constitutional law is to make sure the government is strong enough to provide
for peace and good order, but not so strong that it consumes or destroys the
private interests it is instituted to protect. In dealing with the role of regulation,
it is always wise to remember that governments suffer from two serious
weaknesses. First, their knowledge base is often insecure, for it is difficult for
any benevolent party at the center to understand and combine by any metric the
preferences of millions of different people. The Hayekian critique of centralized
power, and its insistence that market-based exchanges offer the best way to
overcome various information deficits, is as powerful today as it was eighty
years ago.1 6 Second, there is the danger of motivation, well captured in the
concern that Madison expressed in Federalist 10.17 The point about these
elements is that they both are all pervasive whenever and however government
chooses to exert its powers, be it through legislation, regulation, administrative
12. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) ("[W]e hold that the 'right to
exclude,' so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls within this
category of interests that the Government cannot take without compensation.").
13. Compare United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945) ("The critical terms
are 'property,' 'taken' and 'just compensation.' It is conceivable that the first was used in its vulgar and
untechnical sense of the physical thing with respect to which the citizen exercises rights recognized by
law. On the other hand, it may have been employed in a more accurate sense to denote the group of
rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of
it. In point of fact, the construction given the phrase has been the latter."), with Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (describing the takings inquiry as "essentially ad hoc" and
finding that "interference aris[ing] from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of
economic life to promote the common good" did not necessarily constitute a taking even if it infringed
on rights of use and disposition).
14. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (emphasis added)
("We conclude that a permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking without
regard to the public interests that it may serve.").
15. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130-31 ("Appellants concede that the decisions sustaining
other land-use regulations, which, like the New York City law, are reasonably related to the promotion
of the general welfare, uniformly reject the proposition that diminution in property value, standing
alone, can establish a 'taking' .... ).
16. F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. EcON. REv. 519 (1945).
17. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) ("By a faction, I understand a number of citizens,
whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some
common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent
and aggregate interests of the community.").
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action or even judicial behavior. These dangers, for example, are every bit as
great when the government engages in land use regulation as in the permanent
or temporary occupation of real estate. Using high-level scrutiny in physical
occupation cases and low-level scrutiny for "mere" regulation offers redress
against modest intrusion to parties who are exposed to massive regulatory
losses. Similarly, as the recent decisions in Amarin Pharma v. U.S. Food &
Drug Administration9 and United States v. Caronia20 extensively document,
and as a study of the FDA shows, 21 regulating commercial speech can pose
dangers equal to or more dangerous than regulating political speech or artistic
endeavors. The upshot of this is that the rational basis test is utterly unsuited to
deal with basic challenges because its adoption presupposes a level of good
faith that governments often do not have.
More than abstract speculation drives the quest for more ambitious judicial
review, which works in other areas where government action poses threats to
economic or political competition. Note, for example, the contrast between the
former examples and the tough-minded approach to the dormant commerce
clause, where the movement towards strict scrutiny leads to asking the right
questions. 2 2 IS there an anticompetitive tilt to legislation that gives an unwar-
ranted advantage to insiders over the outsiders? Is there some specific danger
that needs to be combatted in the risks that one person or firm's activity poses to
the health and safety of others? The point is that the right concerns can prevail if
only one tries. The same is true with respect to speech, where magically the
same formula applies: a close look at any justifications for restrictions on
speech reveals that such restrictions are usually tied to the threat or use of force,
or to false and misleading speech, restrictions that both have a secure place
within the classical liberal framework.
It is therefore critical to develop a set of interpretive techniques that capture
these structural and substantive concerns. In dealing with this issue, one has to
start with the text and give the words their ordinary interpretation at the time of
the constitutional adoption. But textualism in this sense is only a necessary,
never a sufficient, condition for the interpretation of the Constitution, or indeed
any other document. The correct modes of interpretation dovetail neatly with
the problem of incomplete knowledge and factional intrigue. As to the first, few
18. See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 711
(2010) ("The petitioner here, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., is a nonprofit corporation formed by
people who own beachfront property bordering the project area. . . .").
19. 119 F Supp. 3d 196 (S.D.NY 2015), discussed infra text accompanying notes 71-75.
20. 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012), discussed infra text accompanying note 70.
21. Coleen Klasmeier & Martin H. Redish, Off-Label Prescription Advertising, the FDA and the
First Amendment: A Study in the Values of Commercial Speech Protection, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 315
(2011).
22. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (holding that a state cannot
discriminate against interstate commerce "even in the exercise of its unquestioned power to protect the
health and safety of its people, if reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives, adequate to conserve
legitimate local interests, are available.").
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texts can anticipate all the government actions that may be challenged. Some
degree of adaption is necessary to deal with a wide range of circumstances that
have no explicit textual warrant. This incompleteness of all basic texts is well
known to the parties, be they public or private, who are bound by them. It
follows therefore that some fraction of them at least will do whatever they can
to avoid their application. Clearly, the risk of incompleteness and circumvention
offers a challenge to any system of constitutional interpretation; and legal
norms, conventions, and rules have to be devised to stop that from happening.
Such rules are constantly applied against private parties. For example, the
prohibition against killing covers not only the direct application of force, but
similar cases, most notably setting poison before an unsuspecting person.2 3 But
Congress, like private parties, is often eager to circumvent limitations on its
power as well. If Congress cannot directly regulate the use of child labor in
domestic production, then it will impose a prohibition on those sales in inter-
state commerce by firms that use child labor.2 4 And if the prohibition is struck
down, Congress will then replace it with a somewhat less efficient tax intended
to perform the same function.2 5 If property is protected against taking, then
Congress will just flood someone else's land without bothering to take title.26 In
all these cases, the law has to develop doctrines to protect against subversion of
the basic guarantee, which the anti-circumvention rules have to cover, on both
structural and individual rights issues.
Next, constitutional interpretation follows the private law insofar as it allows
for justifications for prima facie wrongs. For example, deliberate force may be
used in self-defense, even if excessive force may not. And so it is that govern-
ments can indeed exclude some goods from within their boundaries in order to
preserve local flora and fauna.2 7 And it is possible to take property (even
literally and physically) in order to disarm a potential thief or to prevent the
occurrence of a nuisance. 28 This is why a key non-textual element of modern
constitutional interpretation-the police power-is added in as a qualification to
every jurisdictional element and substantive guarantee. But as with the private
law, it is necessary that these be limited in their scope so that the essential
constitutional guarantee is not eviscerated by recognizing necessary exceptions
to it. Thus it is legitimate for the government to stop the creation of a common
23. See, e.g., DIG. 9.2.7.6 (distinguishing between occiderit, i.e., killing, and mortis causam praestit-
erit, i.e., furnishing a cause of death; the former being textual, the latter creating liability by way of
extension).
24. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
25. See Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
26. See Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871).
27. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
28. Note that the so-called per se rule for physical takings in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), is a serious misnomer. There are many justifications for seizing
physical property without compensation, including for misbranded and adulterated drugs. The point
here is that the justifications need to be individually set out and justified. The same approach should
apply to regulatory takings as well.
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law nuisance, but not economic competition-at least so long as the common
law rules were followed before stopping competition (as opposed to stopping
monopoly) became a legitimate government function.29
Working out these details is the ultimate non-textual enterprise, for it depends
on the larger substantive theory of rights that is embedded in the Constitution,
which on these points is a distinctively classical liberal doctrine, with its strong
protection of private property, traditionally understood as the guardian of every
other right, religion, speech, and contract. 30 In dealing with these issues, the
appropriate mode of transformation asks this one simple question: Could one
private party protest the actions of another and do so in a way that commands
legal relief? If the answer to that question is yes, then a police power justifica-
tion is available. But if the answer to that question is no, then there is no police
power justification, and the matter quickly turns to the issue of just compensa-
tion, which could be either in cash or in kind, with the former being more
common when the burden of the regulation hits disproportionately on a single
person and with the latter being appropriate for widespread regulations that
harm and benefit many individuals simultaneously.
Finally, it is necessary to select the correct remedy against a constitutional
violation, just as if it were the commission of a tort or a breach of contract. The
issues here are difficult. The basic choice is between injunctive relief and
damages. But that is only the tip of the iceberg. Injunctions may be complete or
partial, temporary or permanent, conditional or absolute, reviewable or not.
Likewise, damages could be temporary or permanent; and they could respond to
the protection of either a restitution, reliance, or expectation measure of dam-
ages, just as in private law. The point of this exercise is to identify the necessary
and common complexities in constitutional law, which mirror the similar inter-
pretive challenges in common law disputes between private persons. If any-
thing, constitutional law has an additional layer of difficulty because it has to
take into account not only private rights but also the elaborate institutional
structures by which public rights and duties are defined and enforced.
No interpretive system can avoid these difficulties. But just because that is
also true in this context does not call for articulating some "living constitu-
tion." 31 The matters of nuisance and self-defense, for example, come from a
general theory of rights, which was as relevant to ancient and medieval times as
it is to the present. Indeed, all these were in fact addressed in dealing with these
matters. None of the concerns here relate to the vagaries of legislative history,
whether by committee reports (for which there is some credibility) or strategic
29. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 531-33 (1934), is the paradigmatic abuse. For a critique, see
generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, How PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION 78-83 (2006).
30. See generally TIMOTHY SANDEFUR & CHRISTINA SANDEFUR, CORNERSTONE OF LIBERTY: PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN 21ST-CENTURY AMERICA (2d ed. 2015); JAMES W. ELY JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER
RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (3d ed. 2007).
31. For that approach, see generally JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011).
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statements by individual legislators (that usually should be greeted with a great
deal of skepticism).
The question then arises, where in this complex structure is there any room at
all for the rational basis test? The correct answer, I believe, comes in two parts.
The first is that it does not have any role to play in connection with any effort of
the government to regulate the behavior of private parties. I mean this in two
senses, given the enormous expansion of the use of conditional approvals or
exactions (which do have a role, for instance, in the area of drug regulations
when the government issues its positions on such matters). The key point to
understand here is that the use of conditional permits is quite different from
actions by the government to manage its own affairs, as it does whenever it
engages in the standard functions necessary to operate a night watchman state
on the one hand or in carrying out the expanded duties that arise in connection
with the post-New Deal state on the other. Clearly the problems are amplified
with the vastly expanded role of government as an employer or owner, but the
basic principles remain the same in both instances. When the government
manages its own affairs, it will, like any private firm, make errors a fair number
of times. It could not continue to operate under a regime that simultaneously
requires it to compensate the victims of its errors whenever it is wrong but also
does not allow it to capture some substantial fraction of the social gains from its
private beneficiaries when it turns out to be right.
The explanation is simple, given the asymmetrical returns under any regime
of strict tort liability. In general, we think that well-disposed government
officials will produce, on net, benefits for the country at large-otherwise we
would not ask them to engage in certain functions. At this point, it would create
grotesque incentives if government agents had to internalize all the costs but
were unable to internalize the benefit. It is a dangerous business to treat positive
social actions as net negatives on matters of liability. For example, it is highly
inadvisable to hold people who attempt rescues liable for the harms that they are
unable to prevent, and even for the harms that they cause, when the rescue
action offered expected ex ante value. The famous early case that illustrates this
danger is the Tithe Case,3 2 where the defendant moved the plaintiff's grain from
the fields, where it was certain to be destroyed, to a safer location in a barn,
where it was destroyed for causes not specified in the opinion. Ex post, the
plaintiff receives insurance; but, from the ex ante perspective, a rule that holds a
rescuer responsible for the losses, while offering that party nothing for the
gains, will kill the market in assistance. Who will perform such needed tasks
when private incentives diverge from public welfare? A privilege is therefore
necessary in these cases.
Closer to hand is the development of a complex law of sovereign and official
immunity. 3 3 Considerations like this lead to the creation of absolute immunity
32. Y.B. Trin., 21 Hen. 7, f. 26, 27, 28, pl. 5 (1506).
33. See, e.g., The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2016).
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for judges and public prosecutors, while still allowing for the imposition of
other types of sanctions in the event of serious error. The basic point is that so
long as there is a perceived necessity of public service, the misalignment of
incentives works no better than it does in private necessity cases where individu-
als who in times of necessity intervene to help others are later tagged with the
loss. 3 4 It is for just this reason that managers get the benefit of the business
judgment rule in ways that regulators should not. The government always needs
a more powerful justification for the use or threat of force against unwilling
individuals.
Yet at the same time, it is imperative to recognize that the acceptance of a
good faith standard, as under the business judgment rule, is a far cry from the
rational basis standard as announced in the canonical Supreme Court cases. One
of the requirements of good faith is that the speaker means what he says and
says what he means. It is utterly incompatible with the notion of good faith that
the government can change its story when it defends its position in court, as it is
allowed to do in rational basis cases. No corporate or government official could
do that without facing serious charges of gross impropriety. The very fact that
the rational basis test has no known equivalent in the standards dealing with
fiduciary or individual responsibility shows just how far the law has strayed
from well-established historical principles. The switch, moreover, is not inconse-
quential, as rational basis review pervades our current legal regime. In particu-
lar, this tension is often present in FDA cases. In these cases, the government is
not acting as the physician of ordinary citizens, which it does, for instance,
when it provides health care to its employees such as military personnel. Rather,
in cases involving the FDA (or most any administrative agency), it acts as a
regulator who interferes at will with physician-patient relationships on the
ground that it has a better understanding of the risks and benefits of any drug
that it chooses to keep off the market. It is important to see how this plays out,
and it is not a pretty picture.
In the remainder of this article, I shall look at the overall pattern of develop-
ment. Part I offers a capsule summary of the history of FDA regulation. Part II
explores this in three sections. The first explores the rise of the rational basis
test for drug approval. The second speaks about the off-label exception to the
FDA approval process. The third asks about the First Amendment override of
the FDA on the publication of truthful information for unapproved drugs. All of
these intersecting issues raise questions about the scope of the police power
justifications for government regulation. Part III deals with one seemingly
obscure, but vital, question: the proper FDA treatment of compound drugs,
particularly with respect to the removal of drugs from the market. In looking
over these materials, it is never quite clear whether the problem is best under-
34. For a discussion of the problem in connection with this issue, see Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts,
Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More Salute to Ronald Coase, 36 J. LAw & EcON. 553,
579-81 (1993).
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stood as one to which the rational basis test is inapplicable, or one to which it is
applicable but is nonetheless misapplied. In these cases, the standard of review
clearly comes into play because the higher standard in speech cases has led the
government to suffer some stinging defeats. In this context, a close-up look at
how the rational basis test works offers powerful confirmation that it should
never-repeat never-be used as the litmus test in evaluating coercive govern-
ment action.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF FDA AUTHORITY
The first major step in drug regulation was the passage of the Federal Food
and Drug Act of 1906,35 enacted in light of growing concerns over contami-
nated food and quack drugs. The law was intended to stop the proliferation of
fraud in the provision of drugs through its prohibitions of adulteration and
misbranding.3 6 Owing to the strong commerce clause limitation found in United
States v. E.C. Knight Co.,37 the 1906 Act allowed the government to regulate the
manufacture of drugs only in the territories.3 8 Other drugs could only be
regulated insofar as they were shipped or transported in interstate commerce,39
which led to the emergence of a complex jurisdiction that asked when a
particular drug, whether isolated or blended, entered or left commerce, a matter
still important today.40 Given its limited objectives and strong fraud-prevention
35. Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906), 21 U.S.C.
§ 329(a) (1938).
36. Id. at §§ 7 (adulterations), 8 (misbrandings).
37. 156 U.S. 1, 13 (1895) ("The regulation of commerce applies to the subjects of commerce, and
not to matters of internal police. Contracts to buy, sell, or exchange goods to be transported among the
several states, the transportation and its instrumentalities, and articles bought, sold, or exchanged for
the purposes of such transit among the states, or put in the way of transit, may be regulated; but this is
because they form part of interstate trade or commerce. The fact that an article is manufactured for
export to another state does not of itself make it an article of interstate commerce, and the intent of the
manufacturer does not determine the time when the article or product passes from the control of the
state and belongs to commerce.").
38. Supra note 35, at § 1 ("Sec. 1. MANUFACTURE OF ADULTERATED FOODS OR DRUGS.
That it shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture within any Territory or the District of Columbia
any article of food or drug which is adulterated or misbranded, within the meaning of this Act.").
39. Supra note 35, at § 2 ("SEC. 2. INTERSTATE COMMERCE OF ADULTERATED GOODS.
That the introduction into any State or Territory or the District of Columbia from any other State or
Territory or the District of Columbia, or from any foreign country, or shipment to any foreign country
of any article of food or drugs which is adulterated or misbranded, within the meaning of this Act, is
hereby prohibited.").
40. See United States v. Regenerative Sciences, LLC, 741 F.3d 1314, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
("Equally untenable is appellants' contention that because the Procedure occurs entirely within the state
of Colorado, the Mixture lacks a sufficient connection to interstate commerce to permit federal
regulation under the Commerce Clause. It is simply impossible to square this argument with the last
seventy years of Commerce Clause jurisprudence . . . ."); United States v. 40 Cases, More or Less, 289
F.2d 343, 344 (2d Cir. 1961) ("The single question before us on this appeal is whether § 304(a) of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 334(a), authorizes the United States to proceed
against and seize mislabeled or adulterated cans of blended vegetable oils mixed entirely within the
State of New York from various oils shipped under proper labels from other states and foreign
countries.").
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rationale, the 1906 Act falls comfortably within the narrow scope of the police
power of the time.
The first major expansion of the basic act took place in 1938, right after the
expansion of federal commerce clause power. The government received the
added power to regulate the manufacture of drugs within the states and to test
them not only for purity-which is the basic fraud question-but also for safety.
This major extension raises serious implementation problems for the simple
reason that drugs are not simply safe or not safe. All drugs promise a spectrum
of risks and benefits, and the central task is to decide how to weigh the one
against the other, both in individual cases and in the aggregate. At this point, the
government power goes beyond the libertarian function of stopping the produc-
tion of fraud, inasmuch as the government, in principle, is allowed to substitute
its judgment about whether some drug is safe enough in place of the judgment
of patients and their physicians.
This judgment came to be known as GRAS-the "generally recognized as
safe" standard-which dominated much of the FDA law after 1938 and before
1962. In this period, the government's power of review was sharply limited.
Private applicants had to submit their application for new drugs to the govern-
ment, and those applications were deemed approved if the government did not
demand further information about their use within a narrow window of approxi-
mately sixty days. By this time, the pharmaceutical industry had developed
systematic research protocols such that, as noted by Justice Douglas in Wein-
berger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., "[b]etween 1938 and 1962 FDA
had permitted 9,457 NDA's [New Drug Applications] to become effective. Of
these, some 4,000 were still on the market." 4 1 In addition, so-called me-too
variations of these pioneer drugs could be introduced into the market without
any form of prior approval on the ground that they did not materially differ
from the initial, usually patented, drug they imitated.42 The FDA also issued
advisory opinions to companies that their products were generally recognized as
safe by experts within the field. The change in the legal system did not make a
dent in the patterns of investigation or licensing.
Yet all that changed after the thalidomide episode of 1961 which resulted in
the passage of the Kefauver Harris Act of 1962,43 which the FDA continues to
hail for "the scientific safeguards used today by the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) to ensure that consumers will not be the victims of unsafe and
ineffective medications,"" without any awareness of the flip side of the coin-
unnecessary delay and government error. The thalidomide incident clearly
constituted a safety issue, for which it is clear that once that defect became
known, no one would wish to take the drug during the first trimester of
41. 412 U.S. 609, 614 (1973).
42. Id.
43. Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq.
44. FDA, KEFAUVER-HARRIS AMENDMENTS REVOLUTIONIZED DRUG DEVELOPMENT (2012), available at
http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm322856.htm.
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pregnancy. 45 The response to that incident was to transform the FDA into the
powerful agency that it is today. There were two key steps. First, all drugs were
required to go through some preclearance treatment with elaborate submissions
and exhaustive clinical tests, which one recent estimate placed at $2.6 billion
for a new clinical entity, with close to half those costs attributable to the
time-cost of money driven by the long period for clinical trials.4 6 Second,
testing of drugs was not only for safety, but also for effectiveness, so that GRAS
became GRASE, or "generally recognized as safe and effective." The reforms
raised huge questions: how should drug approval take place, and, critically,
what should be done with drugs that had been approved under the 1938 standard
in the post-1962 period? It is at this point that the role of the rational basis test
kicked in.
II. CHEVRON BEFORE CHEVRON
A. The Rise of the Rational Basis Test
Within the new statutory framework, the key response was the powerful
judicial conviction that deference to the administrative agency should apply on
matters of public health. "Constitutional rights of privacy and personal liberty
do not give individuals the right to obtain laetrile free of the lawful exercise of
government police power." 4 7 This substantive position on the expansive reading
of the police power-a Chevron-like deference before Chevron-was echoed
when, in United States v. Rutherford,4 8 the Supreme Court held that expert
agencies were entitled to substantial deference. 4 9 Thus, the dominant legal trope
given to Congress made it easy for Justice Marshall to conclude (correctly) that
Laetrile was a new drug on both the 1938 and 1962 Acts, and that the statutory
language "makes no special provision for drugs used to treat terminally ill
patients,"5 0 no matter how desperate their condition, so that the various plain-
tiffs and their spouses were out of luck.
45. It should be noted that thalidomide is now on the market as a treatment for multiple myeloma,
but obviously it is not on the market for pregnant women. For a recent account, see Natalie Zarrelli,
How Thalidomide Went from Medical Disaster to Miraculous Cancer Treatment, ATLAS OBSCURA (Jan.
18, 2016), http://www.atlasobscura.com/articles/how-thalidomide-went-from-medical-disaster-to-
miraculous-cancer-treatment.
46. Sandra Peters & Peter Lowy, Cost to Develop and Win Marketing Approval for a New Drug Is
$2.6 billion, Tuvrs CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF DRUG DEV. (Nov. 18, 2014), http://csdd.tufts.edulnews/
complete story/pr tufts-csdd_2014_cost-study. The total out of pocket costs average $1.395 billion
with time costs of $1.163 billion.
47. Carnohan v. United States, 616 F.2d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 1980).
48. 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
49. Id. at 553-54 (citations omitted) ("As this Court has often recognized, the construction of a
statute by those charged with its administration is entitled to substantial deference. Such deference is
particularly appropriate where, as here, an agency's interpretation involves issues of considerable public
controversy, and Congress has not acted to correct any misperception of its statutory objectives.").
50. Id. at 551.
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Weinberger and Rutherford were key judicial decisions that backstopped the
decision of Judge Thomas Griffith in Abigail Alliance for Better Access to
Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach.5 ' Abigail Alliance rebuffed the claim
that all individuals are entitled on constitutional grounds to have access to
experimental drugs that have passed a Phase I trial, which is designed to
measure responsiveness to high dosages that could have serious side effects. By
this time, the assertion of police power interests had been strengthened by the
Supreme Court decisions in Washington v. Glucksberg52 and Vacco v. Quill, 5 3
which rejected constitutional claims regarding the benefits of euthanasia/
assisted suicide. The applicable test used in both those cases asked whether that
right was "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," which, given the
extensive history of regulation of health and safety, was a most difficult claim to
defend on those grounds.
The most obvious difference between Glucksberg and Vacco on the one side,
and Abigail Alliance on the other, is that in the former the plaintiffs wanted to
end their lives, while in the latter, they were intent on saving them. It is easier to
see abuse by family members and hospitals in the former situation. Indeed, I
think that the concern is so strong that the Court was right to reject the
unvarnished claim to the right of assisted suicide, given the need to fashion
serious safeguards against its abuse.54 Yet, the carryover to the class of cases in
which patients seek treatment or cures is difficult at best. First, the police power,
even with deference, does not give either the state or federal government the
power to take away all health care decisions from the individual. No matter
what the history might have been, no one would countenance a decision that the
government could use its power of health and safety to force people to take
prescribed medicines that have survived exhaustive FDA scrutiny in the treat-
ment of particular diseases, or to eat those foods and follow those diets that
promise to improve health and longevity.5 5 In those cases, right now it is utterly
immaterial that expert administrators, acting in good faith, have issued the
relevant decrees. The intrusion on personal liberty with that nonstop activity
would be attacked on substantive grounds. It would be merely a matter of detail
to find that clause on which the argument opposing such intrusion could be
based, but substantive due process would be an obvious candidate for that
development, given that it is the ostensible basis for the right (given, at least, the
absence of any coherent jurisprudence that defines the privileges or immunities
of the citizens of the United States). Indeed, the issue would never get to that
51. 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
52. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
53. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
54. For discussion on this point, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO
HEALTH CARE? 329-43 (1997), written before Glucksberg and Vacco.
55. Cf Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2588 (2012) ("[M]any Americans do
not eat a balanced diet . .. Under the Government's theory, Congress could address the diet problem by
ordering everyone to buy vegetables.").
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point because even the statist traditions that dominate the health care area are
not strong enough to overcome that bedrock assumption. It is also instructive to
note that the claim here would not be in any way tied to the terminal condition
of the applicants. Healthy people cannot be made duty bound to take medicine
or to eat broccoli.
The question then arises as to why the argument should be different when
these same people insist on gaining access to drugs that these same government
officials regard as unsafe for personal consumption and use. It is worth noting
that if any private person sought to block another's access to drugs, the conduct
would amount to intentional interference with advantageous relations, a tort that
56has been established for centuries. The FDA uses the government to supply its
guns to keep patients from the care of their physicians, and the deterrent effect
of this backing is so potent that it is never used. In this regard, the tort is
analogous to defamation, which involves the disruption of voluntary arrange-
ments by misrepresentation, a more frequent but less effective way to disrupt
57behaviors.
So, by this view, the question is, normatively, what ground does the govern-
ment have for taking aggressive actions on paternalist grounds, actions that
would never be tolerated if committed by any private individual? It is one thing
to protect individuals by broad rules against false expectations peddled by con
artists. But on this critical point, the difference between Rutherford and Abigail
Alliance is quite different. The Alliance was formed by Abigail's father, Frank
Burroughs, because the late Abigail Burroughs was subject to prolonged denials
of the use of the drug Erbitux, then in clinical trial.5 8 She could not participate
in a clinical trial since she had head and neck cancer, not colon cancer, and she
was unable to obtain a compassionate exemption from drugs that had not
reached the general market. But in her case, the treatment was recommended by
her physicians at Johns Hopkins University, with respect to a drug that is now in
common use with FDA approval.
The central point is this: it is a mystery why her choice to use a particular
drug should be regarded as a public health issue or even a matter of economic
liberty, i.e., the right to enter some occupation or business without government
restriction. It looks to be a personal health issue in which her decision about
whether to take the drug can be made independently of that decision made by
56. See, e.g., Keeble v. Hickeringill, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127, 1128 (K.B. 1707) ("One schoolmaster sets
up a new school to the damage of an ancient school, and thereby the scholars are lured from the old
school to come to his new. (The action was held there not to lie.) But suppose Mr. Hickeringill should
lie in the way with his guns, and fright the boys from going to school, and their parents would not let
them go thither; sure the schoolmaster might have an action for the loss of his scholars."); see also
Tarleton v. McGawley, 170 Eng. Rep. 153 (K.B. 1793).
57. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977) ("A communication is defamatory if it tends so
to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third
persons from associating or dealing with him.").
58. ABIGAIL ALLIANCE, OUR STORY, http://www.abigail-alliance.org/story.php (last visited Aug. 8,
2016).
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anyone else. Given the private institutional safeguards already in place, is it
appropriate to let the cumbrous machinery of the FDA, run by people who have
no knowledge of her personal condition, hold complete veto power over her
choice? In this instance, her cells exhibited a trait that, in the opinion of her
physicians, made her an ideal candidate for the drug.
The issue was one on which the FDA delayed unnecessarily because its
medical experts did not think that the evidence from clinical trials was strong
enough to guarantee the safety of the various potential drugs. 5 9 But that position
will always be true for drugs that are intended to treat rare, and often fatal,
conditions. Consider alternative approaches the FDA might have taken. There
was some respectable, albeit anecdotal, evidence that boys who took these
medicines continued to lead active lives, while those without the medicine were
confined to wheelchairs before they died. There was a large network of pediatric
neurologists who supported the continued use of the drugs. And there was, as
there always is with children's diseases, an active and engaged parent network
whose members probably know more about the condition and its possible
treatment than the FDA experts, precisely because these parents talk and listen
to their children's physicians.
Finally, on September 19, 2016, the FDA granted accelerated approval to
Exondys 51 (eteplirsen), with the caveat that further clinical trials6 0 would need
to be conducted. The FDA release did not mention that Dr. Janet Woodcock,
M.D., director of the FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, had to
fight internal opposition from senior FDA officials who claimed that her deci-
sion would "lower agency standards."6 ' There is not the slightest evidence that
the FDA physicians who lobbied against the drug knew the first thing about
expected value calculations.
The Woodcock decision represents its own profile in courage. But it is
important to recognize that, however welcome the move, it is also seriously
incomplete. A second drug, Kyndrisa (drisapersen), was left untouched by the
59. See Pauline Anderson, FDA Declines Approval for Drisapersen in DMD, MEDSCAPE (Jan. 18,
2016), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/857406; see also Richard A. Epstein, The Other Drug
War, HOOVER INSTITUTION (Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.hoover.org/research/other-drug-war; Tonya Carlone,
(SOS) Sign to Save Our Sons, Give Our Duchenne Boys Their Miracle. FDA Approve Drisapersen,
CHANGE.ORG, available at https://www.change.org/p/sos-sign-to-save-our-sons-give-our-duchenne-boys-
their-miracle (last visited Nov. 14, 2016).
60. FDA, FDA GRANTS ACCELERATED APPROVAL TO FIRST DRUG FOR DUCHENNE MUSCULAR DYSTROPHY,
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm521263.htm (last visited Nov. 14,
2016).
61. See John Carroll, Senior FDA Officials Warned that Approving $300,000 Duchenne Drug Will
Lower Agency Standards, ENDPOINTS NEWS (Sept. 19, 2016), https://endpts.com/senior-fda-officials-
warned-that-eteplirsen-ok-would-lower-fda-standards/ ("The acting chief scientist at the agency, Luci-
ana Borio, argued that an approval would lower the agency's standards and encourage other developers
to pursue the same kind of lobbying campaigns employed at Sarepta. And she accused Sarepta of acting
irresponsibly by knowingly pushing 'misleading' information about the drug. Ellis Unger, director of
the office of drug evaluation, scoffed at the data Sarepta offered, calling the drug a 'scientifically
elegant placebo."').
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Woodcock approval, which gives the sellers of Exondys 51 a huge competitive
advantage that is not warranted by any medical evidence. Indeed, it should be
painfully clear that the insistence of large-scale clinical trial has a huge anticom-
petitive effect when the pool of potential participants has to be divided among
two or more rival entrants. The FDA policy should adapt to this constraint and
allow both drugs onto the market so that the patients, physicians, and parents
can be in a position to adopt differential strategies. One can only speculate how
many other drug treatments never get developed at all because potential firms
and their investors cannot see a clear path to market given the likely FDA
intransigence regarding approval.
There is a larger lesson here. No one should ever belittle the difficulties and
side effects that emerge during clinical trials, but as a matter of first principle
the issue should never be whether the FDA has made the correct risk assess-
ment. The threshold question should be, once the information from trials is
gathered, organized and published, whether the FDA should substitute its
judgment for patients, their families, and their physicians. On this score, the
expert FDA committees should surely have their say, although their selection
criteria that tend to exclude physicians that work for branded companies can
skew their collective judgment.6 2 But I see no reason why parents cannot make
the choice on whether to use that drug on their child, even if it provides no
benefit for anyone else. Yet time and time again, access delays can prove fatal
for unapproved drugs. Sadly, however, the FDA cannot formulate a coherent
standard for deciding what drugs to approve and when. Its insistence on
statistical significance through clinical trials creates long delays and deters
many promising lines of treatment long before a final decision must be made.
To be sure, once approved, the expected treatment value of a drug is likely to be
positive, but it hardly follows that the expected value is negative prior to that
approval. If it is said that patients and their doctors cannot be trusted to make
decisions about unapproved drugs in tandem, why then let them navigate the
myriad treatment options once these drugs are approved? And would it be
constitutional to require that each and every course of chemotherapy or drug
treatment, in the name of public health, must go through an FDA preclearance
response?
Unfortunately, nothing in Abigail's Alliance, or any of its companion deci-
sions, asks the right questions about patient choice. It is quite one thing to
protect traditional liberties. It is quite another to extol traditional forms of
government regulation, many of which were dysfunctional from the time they
were put in place precisely because many cut far deeper than the traditional
state police power over force and fraud. Just ask this simple question: what
62. For my critique, see Richard A. Epstein, Conflicts of Interest in Health Care: Who Guards the
Guardians?, 50 PERSP. IN BIOL. & MED. 72 (2007); Richard A. Epstein, How Conflict-of-Interest Rules
Endanger Medical Progress and Cures, MANHATTAN INSTITUTE, PROJECT FDA REPORT, No. 3, (Oct. 2010),
https://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/how-conflict-interest-rules-endanger-medical-progress-and-
cures-601 1.html.
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would happen if the FDA were unable to block the use of any drug that passed
Phase I clinical trials? Would the world be worse or better off? The answer is
better off, because the absence of government action would speed the rise of,
and expand the scope of, voluntary intermediaries that deal with the information
gaps of patients and physicians in deciding between new and old treatments.
That is why organizations such as the National Comprehensive Cancer Network
(NCCN) thrive even with the FDA in place, as they do a better job getting
information to physicians in a timely fashion about which drugs to use, in what
sequence, in what dosages, and in what combinations. That is why the NCCN
and similar organizations survive in the first place.63 In fact, these organizations
do such a good job that the FDA warnings are widely disregarded precisely
because other information sources are better.64 Fortunately, the government has
no monopoly over information, which is why the information market works
better than the market on actual release. 5 Here is a case where there is no
rational basis to prefer confused public health and police power rationales to the
question of individual choice. Individuals should not be forced to beg the
government for permission to take the only options that offer them some kind of
relief.
B. Off-Label Uses
The issue with FDA competence comes to a head in connection with off-label
uses, i.e., the use of approved drugs by physicians for conditions for which the
FDA has not approved them. A physician's ability to make off-label uses is
almost an historical afterthought, which is said to follow from the observation
that individual physicians who make off-label uses in their own practice are not
caught by the misbranding prohibition.6 6 The enormity of this exception means
that physicians can use any approved drug that they want to treat any condition,
no matter what the FDA says or does. It is equally clear that the exception is the
lifeblood of modern American medicine, especially in cancer cases, where
drugs are routinely used in a high percentage of cases, without any of the formal
63. For an overview of its activities, see NATIONAL COMPREHENSIVE CANCER NETWORK, http://www.nccn.
org (last visited May 30, 2016).
64. See Richard A. Epstein, Against Permititis, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1, 25-30 (2009) (detailing the
advantages of warnings by voluntary associations relative to FDA warnings).
65. On this topic I put aside the possibility of tort liability for warnings that are in compliance with
the FDA standards, which is a confused subject, to say the least. Compare Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S.
555 (2009) (denying federal preemption), with Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604 (2011) (finding
federal preemption). For standardized upstream risks, safe harbors are essential. It is one on which the
FDA has equivocated.
66. See United States v. Evers, 643 F.2d 1043, 1048 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[T]he FDA has at no point
contended, and the government does not argue on appeal, that the misbranding provisions of the Act
prohibit a doctor from prescribing a lawful drug for a purpose for which the drug has not been approved
by the FDA. To the contrary, the FDA has explicitly informed Dr. Evers that he could legally prescribe
chelating drugs for the treatment of circulatory disorders.").
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clinical trials that the FDA deems necessary to put a drug on the market. 7 The
fair question to ask is whether this common practice of off-label uses somehow
compromises the level of medical care provided. By the FDA protocols, the
entire medical profession relies on worthless evidence. Yet, ironically, it is
generally agreed that standard off-label uses set the level of customary care in
medical malpractice cases6" and are routinely reimbursed by various insurance
programs, albeit on non-uniform standards.69 So the question thus remains, why
is it sensible to allow for any use of an approved drug, but no use, save in
infrequent experimental cases, for the first use of a new drug subject to endless
FDA hurdles? It should be clear that two totally different methodologies are at
work. Clinical medicine does not proceed, and never has proceeded, by double-
blind clinical trials in its day-to-day, and so the question is whether the FDA
should be able to choke off new products by making clinical trials-which no
one wishes to ban-the only game in town.7 0 The answer to that question is no,
and one can only imagine the outcry if the FDA or anyone else sought to ban
off-label uses of drugs lawfully on the market. The same should apply to initial
uses of drugs already vetted through an initial round of safety preclearance.
C. First Amendment Protection for Publication of Truthful Information
The question of off-label use raises not only issues of licensing approval, but
also issues regarding the dissemination of information to the trade and the
67. See, e.g., Monika K. Krzyzanowska, Off-Label Use of Cancer Drugs: A Benchmark Is Estab-
lished, 31 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1125 (2013), available at http://jco.ascopubs.org/content/31/9/1125.full,
which contains a thoughtful analysis of the pros and cons of these uses. On the issue of frequency of
use, she refers to one study that found that approximately 70% of claims were on label. Among the 30%
of claims considered to be off label on the basis of the FDA-approved indication, 14% conformed to
National Comprehensive Cancer Network (NCCN)-supported off-label indications, and 10% of off-
label use was in the same cancer site but not the stage or line of therapy as that stated on the FDA label.
The annual cost of off-label use was approximately $4.5 billion. The prevalence of off-label use varied
significantly by drug; agents such as bortezomib and trastuzumab were generally used on label, whereas
other drugs, especially rituximab, gemcitabine, and bevacizumab, were more commonly used off than
on label. In fact, off-label use of bevacizumab was the single largest contributor to the cost of off-label
prescribing. See also Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use: Rethinking the Role of the
FDA, 358 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1427, 1427 (2008) (finding that approximately 21% of prescriptions were
for off-label purposes).
68. See Veronica Henry, Off-Label Prescribing Legal Implications, 20 J. LEGAL MED. 365, 370
(1999) ("Under common law, writing an off-label prescription is not 'per se' negligent. The standard of
care is usually established by evidence of community medical standards. Commonplace off-label use
consistent with community practice generally does not constitute malpractice.").
69. IMPACT REPORT, Tufrs CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DRUG DEVELOPMENT (March/April 2009),
available at http://csdd.tufts.edulfiles/uploads/summarymar-apr_09.pdf ("75% of U.S. health plans
reimburse off-label uses of prescription drugs.").
70. One common objection to off-label use is that it disrupts the operation of clinical trials. See Final
Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,074, 64,080
(Dec. 3, 1997) ("FDA's guidance also serves to protect the public health by preserving the integrity of
the premarket approval process . . . "). But the ban applies even for individuals like Abigail Burroughs
who are unable to participate in these trials, as well as to individuals who prefer to forgo clinical trials
in order to pursue other avenues. Nor is it clear that clinical trials would not be better designed if their
sponsors faced market competition.
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public about such drugs' availability and use. In line with my general libertarian
inclinations, any rule that prevents the publication of truthful information
should be struck down under the First Amendment unless some specific justifica-
tion for it-the control of military or trade secrets, for example-can be found.
No one could say that it was impermissible for physicians, economists, law
professors, or anyone else to publish a critique that savages the FDA for its
inhumane practices or that extols the virtues of an unapproved drug.71 The
question then arises as to whether the FDA can prevent the company that makes
a particular product from engaging in truthful publication about the drug or
about the FDA's treatment of their applications. The FDA view-namely, that
these publications can be proscribed on the ground that they count as an illicit
and unauthorized promotion of the drug-has run into fierce resistance as of
late, most notably in two decisions that illustrate the importance of the constitu-
tional gulf between rational basis and any higher standard of review. In United
States v. Caronia,7 2 the Second Circuit, by a divided vote, held that the FDA
could not bring criminal prosecutions for misbranding when Orphan Drug
Company, which manufactured the drug Xyrem, hired Caronia to promote that
drug through the dissemination of truthful information. The upshot of a long
and convoluted argument was, yes, the speech was protected by the First
Amendment, so much so that the FDA could not use that information as
evidence of either some unlawful action or mental state needed to sustain its
statutory claim for misbranding. The consequence of this decision was that a
broader market was exposed to the drug, such that the FDA's reduced control
over its information flow was likely to lead to more off-label uses and hence
higher sales. Clearly, no other party has as much incentive to push Xyrem as
Orphan, so the decision represents a key way to undercut monopoly control
over the drug use.
Caronia in turn set the stage for the more recent case of Amarin Pharma, Inc.
v. FDA, 7 3 which is discussed in greater detail because of its close examination
into the FDA's laborious approval process. Amarin had developed the drug
Vascepa, for which it received FDA approval for use in lowering triglyceride
concentrations over 500 mg/dL of blood-levels that expose patients to in-
creased risks of pancreatitis and cardiovascular disease. At stake in the case was
whether Amarin should be able to piggyback on its earlier work in order to
address lower, but still elevated triglyceride concentrations (namely, concentra-
tions between 200 and 499 mg/dL) for people who are already on statins.
Clearly there is no sharp clinical line between these two cases, which is
precisely what makes off-label uses attractive, especially when such off-label
71. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
761-62 (1976) ("No one would contend that our pharmacist may be prevented from being heard on the
subject of whether, in general, pharmaceutical prices should be regulated, or their advertisement
forbidden.").
72. 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
73. 119 F Supp. 3d 196 (S.D.N.Y 2015).
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uses entail lower dosages with fewer side effects. It is likely, but not certain,
that both the risks and benefits are lower for this second class of cases, but by
the same token the net benefit could be as large, or perhaps larger, than
Vascepa's use on a more limited population at a higher dosage.
Mindful of these considerations, the FDA entered into a so-called "special
protocol assessment" (SPA) with Amarin, which allowed it to do expedited
clinical trials at lower levels on Vascepa. That SPA permitted the FDA to
rescind the original understanding on a showing that "a substantial scientific
issue essential to determining the safety or effectiveness of the drug has been
identified after the testing has begun."7 The FDA asserted such a reason after
clinical trials on similar drugs had failed to establish a reduction in cardiovascu-
lar risk for patients. Indeed, an advisory committee had voted nine to two to
suspend the SPA because of its doubts about the benefit side of the equation.
The issue before Judge Paul Engelmayer was not whether the government had
acted in breach of contract, where the FDA would have had solid defenses.
Instead, the issue was with a request from Amarin, as well as certain doctor-
plaintiffs, who made an "as-applied First Amendment challenge to FDA regula-
tions that prohibit Amarin 'from making completely truthful and non-
misleading statements about its product to sophisticated healthcare professionals,'
including the doctor plaintiffs."
Amarin's point was to present truthful evidence about the lower levels of
triglycerides obtained and to distribute clinical studies bearing on that question
that would let individual physicians decide whether that benefit was offset by
conflicting evidence on the expected therapeutic effect. In response, the FDA
wanted to condition these disclosures on the willingness to include FDA's own
statements stressing the limitations on the existing studies, and to block distribu-
tion of the complete record of the clinical studies. At this point, Judge Engel-
mayer applied the four-part Central Hudson test,7 6 and it was a relatively simple
matter to conclude that the restrictions on speech were serious, and could not be
77justified given the legitimate status of off-label uses.
The plaintiff's case in Amarin was examined under a commercial speech
rubric, which does not quite fit the publication of research data from clinical
74. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(5)(C)(ii) (2012).
75. 119 F Supp. 3d at 212.
76. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) ("In
commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At the outset, we must determine
whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within
that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must deter-
mine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.").
77. Amarin Pharma, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d at 226 (holding that "insofar as Amarin seeks preliminary
relief recognizing its First Amendment right to be free from a misbranding action based on truthful
speech promoting the off-label use of an FDA-approved drug, Amarin has established a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits on this point.").
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trials. Indeed, one reason to be leery of the Supreme Court approach is that the
line drawing problems in this area are quite acute. A simpler approach is that,
consistent with the basic libertarian thrust, the typical strict scrutiny standard
applicable to typical First Amendment cases should be satisfied to justify
prohibiting the dissemination of lawful information. The point here again does
not go to the soundness of Amarin's interpretation of the data. The FDA could
well have been correct that the expanded use of Vascepa is unwarranted, and the
FDA could express that view in its own publications targeted to these same
doctors without compelling Amarin to communicate its views.
More to the point is to ask whether this same libertarian analysis makes it
more difficult to keep in place the sharp difference between speech and conduct.
If physicians are allowed to prescribe drugs for off-label uses based on informa-
tion already on the market, why not let them do the same for all drugs, at least if
they have passed the minimum Phase I trials? The effort to create a sharp
constitutional line between speech and conduct in this context fails, as it does in
so many others. The same basic framework applies to both.
III. REMOVING OLD DRUGS FROM THE MARKET
Last, the role of rational basis review also arises in connection with many
drugs that were brought to market between 1938 and 1962. As noted earlier, this
was a period of heavy innovation. But it would be mistaken to assume that all
licensed pre-1962 drugs remained in use thereafter. As Weinberger notes, about
one-half those drugs were no longer in use.78 So why? At the global level, the
simple truth is that FDA drug approval never guarantees market acceptance.
Certain drugs are hard to tolerate; others are approved but then displaced by
newer drugs with fewer side effects; some conditions are better treated by
nondrug methods. Innovation and attrition exert a high level of post-approval
scrutiny and review.
The question then arises: How effective is that second screen? In this regard,
the judicial decisions that have dealt with the construction of the 1962 Act have
uniformly taken the FDA's position that even when the law speaks of GRASE,
it in fact allows the FDA to demand that old drugs be subjected to more
exhaustive clinical trials. The striking disjunction between ordinary language
and statutory language is made very clear in (then) Judge Breyer's influential
opinion in United States v. 50 Boxes More or Less,79 which involved an FDA
seizure-hence the 50 Boxes-of "Cafergot P-B Suppository, a drug that
contains two active ingredients (caffeine, ergotamine) designed to stop vascular
headaches, such as migraines, and two other active ingredients (pentobarbital,
bellafoline) designed to stop nauseous side effects resulting from the first two
ingredients."so As Judge Breyer noted, in statutory construction things are not
78. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
79. 909 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990).
80. Id. at 25.
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often as they seem. The suppository was a new drug even though it was widely
and successfully sold in the market place for over thirty-five years. It was lawful
to sell their components separately. In addition, Sandoz, its manufacturer, was
prepared to offer a wealth of expert evidence that its drug had proved safe and
effective over its long period of use. But it was all to no avail.
The ultimate justification for the decision rested on the general police power
justifications offered in Weinberger and the correlative deference to FDA. But
why? This suppository was a combination of two old drugs that could be taken
separately. Many drugs fall into that class, and the problem is so important that
just recently the FDA issued new guidelines as to how these drugs are to be
evaluated."' The basic principle here is that the compound has to be tested even
if its components are safe. But note that this argument assumes again that
clinical trials are the only form of reliable evidence that deals with drug
safety-an assumption that is falsified by the extensive and successful off-label
use of many compounds.
Indeed, the case against the FDA's standard depends on the unavoidable
weaknesses of clinical trials. One key limitation of clinical trials is their
comparative shortness. Even the FDA knows that it cannot tie up drugs forever,
so consequently some drugs will reach the market even with some residual risk
of some long-term effect that could alter the cost/benefit balance. But drugs
have to be approved sometime, which means that the available data does not
speak to long-term risks, which are typically evaluated by private organizations
like NCCN that regularly review and update information. It is critical in this
context to understand that the information needed to practice medicine well is
not found in some simple yes/no answers, but instead it requires a full and
up-to-date account that allows for rational downstream choices.
A second key limitation is that the sample sizes available in clinical trials are
limited both by the availability of patients and the costs of conducting clinical
trials. Given the number of potential drugs to test, and the ever more exacting
FDA standards, many clinical trials done under FDA supervision of necessity
involve the use of foreign data, but that data is only introduced when collected
by sponsors of clinical trials under FDA supervision.8 2 It is not possible to
introduce to the FDA evidence that foreign governments collect for their own
work, or to introduce the accumulated evidence from world-wide practice,
which helps drive off-label usage. Hence, two vital sources of information fail
to meet the FDA standard of what counts as valid scientific evidence, given
differences in clinical conditions and study populations. But it is irrational to
81. See FDA, ACCEPTANCE OF MEDICAL DEVICE CLINICAL DATA FROM STUDIES CONDUCTED OUTSIDE THE
UNITED STATES (Apr. 22, 2015), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/
deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/ucm443133.pdf.
82. For the complicated rules, see FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FDA STAFF: FDA ACCEPTANCE
OF FOREIGN CLINICAL STUDIES NOT CONDUCTED UNDER AN IND, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (Mar.
2012), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Regulatorylnformation/Guidances/UCM294729.pdf.
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count this evidence for naught, given that everyone has strong incentives to
uncover failed drugs.
The result is especially galling for compound drugs because there is good
reason to believe that they are often safer than the two drugs taken separately.
The use of the compound pill adds another option for physicians in treating
patients. In many instances, this option could prove exceedingly valuable
because the dispensing of a single drug whose active ingredients are in fixed
proportions reduces the likelihood of error in administration. Getting drugs in
the right balance to sick patients of limited competence is often a very difficult
task requiring extensive on-the-ground supervision. Hence any innovation that
reduces this source of cost and error is a clear blessing. To be sure, the same
ratios may not work in all cases, which is why the ability to prescribe both
drugs separately still makes sense. But knowing the underlying situation, it is
fair to ask just what information gap is filled by demanding a new round of
clinical trials. If the original trial does not look for interactive effects, why do so
here, when these would surely be evident from the high levels of use. The only
conceivable issue could be the stability of the combined molecule, which seems
like a thin reed on which to rest demands for clinical trials.
Recall the nature of the inquiry. Stable use is what clinical trials are supposed
to establish. But when it is established by other means (such as through regular
off-label use, for which data is available, or at least potentially available), the
FDA's discretion only reduces choice, adds cost, and perhaps results in a decline
in health for the potential patient population. It is not too much to demand that
the FDA produce by its own efforts some independent evidence of a breakdown,
at which point the drug is likely to be already pulled from the market. Yet given
the wholesale disregard of all relevant institutional factors, FDA regulation on
this topic, as on others, shows not the slightest awareness of the relevant
trade-offs. It is, of course, always possible to ask, under the current capacious
standards of rational basis, whether the accumulated sins of professional manage-
ment matter, so long as there are some cases where clinical trials make good
sense. But in my view, it cannot be rational to adopt any procedure that looks to
be both more costly and less reliable than any other. It is not rational to place
exclusive reliance on clinical trials whenever abundant supplementary evidence
is at least of equal quality, if not more so. Even under our bizarre rational basis
jurisprudence, it seems systematically perverse to place new obstacles in the
path of drugs long on the market.
In the end, if it is necessary to shoehorn these cases into the rational basis
category, it should be done here. But, alternatively, given that the FDA operates
coercively, the rational basis test should be consigned to the dustbin of history.
Either way, the FDA monopoly over drug access should be curtailed.
CONCLUSION
In dealing with political and social institutions, we must grapple with two
fundamental issues: power and information. The FDA is a government agency
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designed to protect the public. It should use its power to curb fraud and
deception by private parties. It should not use that power to control either
private behavior on individual health matters or private access to information
about drugs and devices-information for which there is a huge demand. With
both access and information, the government operates as a regulator, not a
manager, so something like the business judgment rule is far too forgiving a
standard for evaluating its conduct. A fortiori, the rational basis test, which is
even more lenient, is not an appropriate standard for constitutional oversight. In
dealing with new drugs, the FDA claims the power to override individual
judgments on matters of health and safety. It cannot do so to protect public
health because there are no risks of contagion or communicable diseases. If the
decision to turn down treatment is deeply personal, so too is the decision to
accept that treatment. In both contexts, a heavy burden lies on the government
when it wishes to restrict a fundamental personal liberty. In connection with the
FDA's chokehold over new drugs, that burden cannot be discharged. The rules
on clinical trials ignore too much evidence and act as though the standard rules
of medical inquiry, used with respect to off-label drugs, are beyond redemption.
And its effects of throttling the dissemination of relevant information have, and
should, fall to First Amendment challenges. But so too should its coercive
restrictions on sale and use. This extraordinary use of government coercion
should not be subject to benign judicial oversight under the rational basis test.
The FDA should always be allowed to state, in whatever terms it chooses, its
objection to various courses of action. But advice is one thing; coercion is
another. Right now there are curbs on its ability to prevent the free flow of
truthful information. The next step is to remove its power to keep desperately
desired clinical treatments off the market.
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